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Inconceivable: Status, Contract, And The 







With the fight for same-sex marriage in the rearview mirror, legal 
advocates have turned their attention to legally securing parenting rights 
for gay and lesbian people against this new landscape. Adults in same-sex 
couples often share parenting responsibilities for children who are 
biologically related only to one of them. What, short of adoption, should 
establish the legal tie between a child and a non-biologically related adult? 
A consensus answer to that question has emerged among scholars and 
advocates of gay and lesbian family law: intent to parent and socially 
functioning as a parent. Using as an entry point the recent decision of the 
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U.S. Supreme Court in Pavan v. Smith, which extended the “parentage 
presumption” to married lesbian co-parents, this Article examines the 
consensus answer closely, characterizing the proposed shift as a move 
from status (biological parenthood) to contract (parenthood by intent or 
implied in fact). It invites the reader to consider such a move with 
particular mindfulness of the drawbacks that may accrue in the most 
vulnerable sectors of the gay and lesbian community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The law reform strategy of the major LGBT advocacy organizations 
seems premised on an identity of interests between gay men and lesbians. 
Much of the time, the interests of these two constituencies are in fact 
aligned, as is the case with anti-discrimination protections. A recent 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, however, exposes the limits of this 
alignment. 
At the end of the 2016 term, the Supreme Court issued Pavan v. 
Smith1 to little fanfare. The case reversed a decision of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court2 regarding the importance of Obergefell v. Hodges3 to an 
Arkansas statute governing birth certificates. Pavan secured a long-sought 
 
 1. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 2. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d. 169 (Ark. 2016), rev’d per curiam, 137 S. Ct. 2075 
(2017). 
 3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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parenting right for married lesbian couples, ensuring that when one partner 
gives birth using anonymous sperm donation, the other is a presumed co-
parent.4 
With the campaign for same-sex marriage in the United States now 
in the rearview mirror, advocates have directed their attention to securing 
parenting rights for LGBT people against this new landscape. One glaring 
obstacle to legally securing same-sex parenting arises from the 
impossibility of a same-sex couple—comprising two cisgender persons5— 
producing a biological child by combining their gametes. To overcome 
this problem, legal scholars interested in advancing the status of gay and 
lesbian non-biological parents have urged a turn to contractual concepts 
for determining parenthood—namely, the intent to parent and functioning 
socially as a parent. So far, scholarship extolling the promise of an actual 
shift—one that is already well underway in the doctrine—has largely 
focused on the benefits to gay and lesbian people seeking to raise children. 
None have observed that the shift itself, one that has occurred in many 
fields of law, effectively proposes a move from status to contract, nor have 
any grappled deeply with the possible costs of such a move for subparts of 
the internally diverse gay and lesbian population. 
Pavan represents an important victory for married lesbians, but it also 
raises a question too infrequently posed in the context of LGBT progress: 
who is left behind, and to what extent have their interests been 
undermined? Pavan does absolutely nothing for married gay men, and 
may even contribute to their degraded status as parents. The interests of 
gay and lesbian people may in fact turn out to be more fragmented—and 
even conflictual—than this. In addition to different biological capacities, 
gay and lesbian people are differentiated by race, class, region, marital 
status, and lifestyle preferences. 
Using Pavan as a launching pad, this Article argues that the solution 
that legal scholars are advancing to overcome the obstacle of biological 
relation poses differential risks to differently situated members of the gay 
and lesbian community. Intent and function as bases for parenthood, while 
likely to advance the interests of the most privileged sectors of the gay and 
lesbian community, may come to disserve that community’s most 
marginalized members on axes of race, class, region, and sexual lifestyle. 
 
 4. See infra note 42 for discussion of a more limited reading of Pavan. 
 5. The problem discussed in this Article relies on the assumption that the men and 
women under consideration are cismen and ciswomen. A transwoman might well be in a 
position to biologically father a child and a transman might well be impregnated. 
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After discussing the details and pertinence of this new Supreme Court 
precedent, this Article traces some of Pavan’s antecedents to gain a deeper 
understanding of its meaning for the law’s differential treatment of men 
and women in the context of parenting. The Article then proceeds to situate 
Pavan in the broader discussion among scholars of gay and lesbian family 
law, focusing especially on the consensus around parental intent and 
function. Finally, this Article interrogates the risks that grounding 
parenthood in these contractual concepts poses to vulnerable sectors of the 
gay and lesbian community. 
 
II. PAVAN V. SMITH 
Arkansas law provides that when a child is born, the name of the 
biological mother appears on the birth certificate.6 Further, when a married 
woman gives birth, the name of the mother’s husband appears as the father 
on the birth certificate,7 though there are two exceptions to this general 
rule. First, if “paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of 
competent jurisdiction,” the husband’s name will not appear.8 Second, 
both spouses and a putative father could enter notarized affidavits 
contradicting the presumption of the husband’s paternity.9 
 
 6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e) (2010) states that: 
For the purposes of birth registration, the mother is deemed to be the woman 
who gives birth to the child, unless otherwise provided by state law or 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the 
birth certificate. The information about the father shall be entered as 
provided in subsection (f) of this section. For the purposes of birth 
registration, the mother is deemed to be the woman who gives birth to the 
child, unless otherwise provided by state law or determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the birth certificate. The 
information about the father shall be entered as provided in subsection (f) 
of this section.  
Id. 
 7. “If the mother was married at the time of either conception or birth or between 
conception and birth the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father 
of the child, unless . . . .” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2010). 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1)(A) (2010).  
 9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1)(B) (2010) states that: 
The mother executes an affidavit attesting that the husband is not the father 
and that the putative father is the father, and the putative father executes an 
affidavit attesting that he is the father and the husband executes an affidavit 
attesting that he is not the father. Affidavits may be joint or individual or a 
combination thereof, and each signature shall be individually notarized. In 
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This is a typical state law regime,10 and is traceable back at least to 
the eighteenth-century British jurist Lord Mansfield, who observed “a 
common-law rule of evidence that disqualifies a husband and wife from 
testifying as to nonaccess—lack of sexual relations—between them where 
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived during their marriage is at 
issue.”11 While Lord Mansfield’s Rule is a rule of evidence, it generally 
“operates in conjunction with a legal presumption that a child born or 
conceived during the marriage is legitimate.”12 Indeed, once the 
exceptions are considered, it might be most accurate to say that the 
evidentiary rule has effectively evolved into a widespread presumption in 
American states. 
An additional provision of Arkansas law—Section 9-10-201(a)—
renders the presumption of the husband’s paternity conclusive under one 
circumstance: “Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial 
insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman 
and the woman’s husband if the husband consents in writing to the 
artificial insemination.”13 This provision admits no exceptions. Its use of 
the term “natural” makes it clear that the consenting husband of a woman 
who conceives through artificial insemination of donor sperm need not 
adopt the resulting child to secure his paternal rights. His paternity is 
conclusively presumed. This rule, too, predominates among the states.14 
Family law scholars and practitioners have been wondering, at least 
since Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health,15 the case that led 
 
such event, the putative father shall be shown as the father on the certificate 
and the parents may give the child any surname they choose. 
Id. 
 10. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2339 
(2017) [hereinafter NeJaime, Nature]. 
 11. Note, Prohibiting Nonaccess Testimony by Spouses: Does Lord Mansfield’s Rule 
Protect Illegitimates?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (1977). 
 12. Id. at 1458. 
 13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2010). Note that the word “anonymous” does not 
appear in the section. As Joanna L. Grossman explained, “[m]ost state sperm donor laws 
do not differentiate between known and unknown sperm donors on their face.” Joanna L. 
Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 322 (2017). Courts are 
left to determine whether the statute applies identically in the two circumstances. Wary of 
attributing too much meaning to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pavan and cognizant that 
if a known donor were to intervene in such a case and assert his paternity it would raise 
additional issues, I assume that the decision is limited to instances of anonymous sperm 
donation unless and until the holding is explicitly extended, or generally applied, to cases 
involving known donors.  
 14. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10 at 2291, 2367–69. 
 15. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d. 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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Massachusetts to become the first U.S. jurisdiction to confer marital status 
on same-sex couples, whether the parentage presumption would apply in 
the case of two women. If one of the women in a married lesbian couple 
gives birth using anonymously donated sperm, is the other woman’s 
parentage presumed? The parentage presumption preserves no less a 
fiction in the case of a heterosexual married couple that relied on third-
party sperm to conceive, but could the fiction bear the weight of a female 
spouse? Does the conspicuous impossibility of a woman biologically 
fathering a child render the fiction unsustainable in a lesbian context? 
Pavan involved two married lesbian couples.16 One of the spouses in 
each couple gave birth to a child conceived using anonymously donated 
sperm.17 Both couples sought to have the other spouse named on the birth 
certificate, but in both cases, the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) 
named only the birth mother.18 
The couples launched a challenge in state court, where a sympathetic 
trial judge ordered ADH to issue amended birth certificates recognizing 
each birth mother’s female spouse as a parent and declaring parts of 
subsections 20-18-401 (e) and (f) to be unconstitutional in light of 
Obergefell.19 Nathaniel Smith, the Director of ADH, appealed to the 
state’s highest court, but agreed in the meantime to provide the families 
with amended birth certificates.20 
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s constitutional 
holding.21 It reasoned that while Obergefell addressed the marital relation, 
Pavan concerned the parent-child relation.22 Citing a dictionary definition 
of the term “father” as “a man who has begotten a child,” the court 
observed that while the governing statute instructed that a husband would 
be named as the father on a birth certificate, it also provided that a court 
could determine that another man was the father and that affidavits from 
 
 16. A third couple presented a related, but slightly different, legal issue not taken up 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore, not discussed in this Article. This third couple 
was not yet married at the time of the child’s birth, so the question was instead whether the 
couple could legitimize the child by marrying subsequent to the birth. See Smith v. Pavan, 
505 S.W.3d 169, 172–73 (2016). The relevant section of the Arkansas code is 20-18-
406(a)(2), which contains the rules for legitimation. 
 17. See Smith, 505 S.W.3d. at 172.  
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 173. 
 20. See id. at 173 n.1. 
 21. See id. at 172. 
 22. See id. at 178. 
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the relevant parties could prevent operation of the presumption.23 The 
critical policy consideration animating the statute, therefore, was the 
biological relationship between parent and child.24 
An affidavit submitted by Melinda Allen, the Vital Records Registrar 
at ADH, bolstered this conclusion. Allen stated that “[i]dentification of 
biological parents through birth records is critical to ADH’s identification 
of public health trends, and it can be critical to an individual’s 
identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions.”25 Allen 
further attested that even in cases of adoption, where an amended birth 
certificate reflecting the names of the adoptive parents is issued, the 
original birth certificate is maintained under seal so that biological 
parenthood can be discovered for health purposes.26 Because biological 
relation was central to the statutory scheme, and because “[i]t does not 
violate equal protection to acknowledge basic biological truths,”27 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the statute should be upheld. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not specifically rule on the 
constitutionality of Section 9-10-201(a), the section specifying that a 
“husband” who consents in writing to his wife’s artificial insemination 
shall be named on the birth certificate. Smith, the Director of ADH, 
actually conceded in the trial court that use of the term “husband” in that 
section was probably “constitutionally infirm” after Obergefell.28 The 
complaint did not frame that term as the constitutional defect, however, 
and the trial court did not address it. Then, because that issue was not 
technically on appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court also declined to 
consider it.29 
The couples’ petition for a writ of certiorari arrived at the United 
States Supreme Court in February 2017. At the end of June, the writ was 
granted and the case decided in one fell swoop: no briefs, no oral 
argument—a.k.a. summary reversal. The main opinion in Pavan was per 
curiam, representing the positions of at least four and not more than six 
 
 23. Id.  
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 179. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Smith, 505 S.W.3d. at 181. 
 28. Id. at 181. 
 29. See id. The decision elicited three separate dissents from the seven-member court, 
including a concurrence-dissent by the state’s Chief Justice, who opened with two verses 
from Bob Dylan’s The Times They Are A-Changin’. “Come senators, congressmen / Please 
heed the call / Don’t stand in the doorway / Don’t block up the hall . . . .” Id. at 183 (Brill, 
C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
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justices. Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito were in dissent. In fewer 
than five full pages, the justices behind the per curiam opinion found 
that—contrary to the contention of the state supreme court—”Arkansas 
law makes birth certificates about more than just genetics.”30 The opinion 
pointed specifically to the provision granting a consenting husband a place 
on the birth certificate if his wife was artificially inseminated with donor 
sperm, notwithstanding the fact that he “is definitively not the biological 
father.”31 The Court concluded that “Arkansas has . . . chosen to make its 
birth certificates more than a mere marker of biological relationships . . . 
[and] [h]aving made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with 
Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that recognition.”32 
It is not clear exactly what, if anything, was struck down here. The 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court and 
“remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,”33 
but did not squarely declare any provision of Arkansas law to be 
unconstitutional. Since the couples had already obtained amended birth 
certificates, there was also no instruction from the Court on that point. 
Justice Gorsuch, for the three dissenters, fixed his attention first on 
the majority’s decision to use summary reversal.34 That mechanism is 
supposed to be reserved for matters in which “the law is settled and 
stable,” which Justice Gorsuch did not think the issue in this case was.35 
His second objection was that, if we zoom out, we can see that the 
overall statutory scheme is designed to record biological relationships for 
legitimate public health purposes, such as tracking genetic disorders. 
Naming the birth mother’s husband on the birth certificate where the 
biological father is in fact a sperm donor is an exception. The plaintiffs’ 
challenges were framed to disrupt the biologically-based birth certificate 
regime.36 Why didn’t the plaintiffs just attack the constitutionality of the 
“husband” language in the exception? Considering the entire statutory 
scheme, Justice Gorsuch, much like the Arkansas Supreme Court, thought 
that Obergefell did not govern—Nguyen v. INS37 did. Nguyen, which is 
discussed in greater detail below, upheld a section of the Immigration and 
 
 30. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2079. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id.  
 36. See id. at 2080. 
 37. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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Nationality Act that provided separate rules for unmarried biological 
mothers and unmarried biological fathers seeking to convey their 
American citizenship to a child born abroad.38 The case was premised on 
the significance of biological differences concerning pregnancy and birth. 
Given Nguyen, Justice Gorsuch thought, after the statute’s larger purpose 
was considered, biology also settled the question in Pavan. 
Finally, Justice Gorsuch noted that by the time of the decision, 
Arkansas had already put the names of the birth mothers’ spouses on the 
birth certificates, so there was no longer any remedy to be had.39 What, he 
asked, was supposed “to happen on remand that hasn’t happened 
already”?40 Fair question. Should Arkansas have considered its birth 
certificate statute invalid? That is not specified in the per curiam opinion. 
Perhaps the majority would have liked to see the statutory term “husband” 
construed to mean “spouse” and applied without regard to the sex of the 
birth mother’s partner, but the majority did not state this precisely. 
The question in Pavan regarding the operation of the parentage 
presumption in the case of a married lesbian couple needed an answer. 
Apparently thinking the safest course is to use glue and nails, LGBT 
advocacy organizations, such as GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders 
(GLAD) have been advising married lesbian couples to make use of 
second parent adoption,41 a mechanism that predates same-sex marriage 
and enables same-sex couples to secure parenting rights to a child that is 
biologically related to only one of them. Pavan seems to relieve married 
lesbians of the need to go through a second parent adoption where the birth 
mother is impregnated using anonymous sperm donation.42 Still, Pavan 
 
 38. See id. at 73. 
 39. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2080 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Second Parent Adoption, GLAD, https://www.glad.org/overview/second-
parent-adoption/massachusetts/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2017). 
 42. According to one reading of Pavan, the holding is limited to birth certificates and 
does not apply to “the presumption of parentage itself” because “a birth certificate is merely 
prima facie evidence of the information stated within.” Jessica Feinberg, Whither the 
Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex 
Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOKLYN L.R. 
55, 77 n.125 (2017). If lower courts abide by this conservative reading, then the paternity 
presumption has not actually been extended to lesbian spouses and Pavan accomplishes 
very little. Cf. id. at 88. The distinction between parentage and prima facie evidence thereof 
seems an awfully slim reed, however, upon which to deny lesbian spouses the presumption 
after Pavan. My own reading, which I hope is not too hasty or incautious, is that Pavan 
extends the parentage presumption to female spouses in any jurisdiction that applies it to 
male spouses (i.e., all 50 states, see Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through 
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may not have been the best case for the Supreme Court to review because 
the remedy was provided before the case left Arkansas, and the statutory 
presumption in the case of donor-insemination-with-spousal-consent was 
not technically on appeal. If the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari 
in Pavan, surely a case with similar facts would have arrived before long. 
 
III. MATERNAL PRIMACY 
Read one way, Pavan is an advance not only for lesbians qua 
lesbians, but also for sex-based equality. Whether the biological mother’s 
spouse is male or female, that spouse is entitled to the same treatment. The 
case distinguishes itself from cases such as Obergefell, however, in that it 
effectively, if silently, leaves a legal distinction between married lesbians 
and married gay men. That is because the unquestioned assumption upon 
which both the decision and the underlying statutory scheme rely is the 
primacy of the biological mother. The biological mother’s relationship to 
the child is never open to question; the fact of her having given birth 
conclusively provides her with parental rights. 
Pavan is hardly the first case to accord primacy to biological mothers 
over biological fathers, though the distinction typically arises in the 
context of non-marital parents. A long line of cases addresses the rights of 
non-marital fathers. The foundational case of Lehr v. Robertson43 involved 
 
the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589 (2018), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/author/courtney-g-joslin). On my reading, an attempt by a 
state to distinguish between being recorded as the parent and acquiring the status of a parent 
would undercut the central message of Pavan, that after Obergefell, the spouse of the birth 
mother must be treated equally, regardless of whether that spouse is male or female. The 
Arizona Supreme Court seems to agree. Shortly after Pavan came down, the Arizona 
Supreme Court applied it to a case that raised essentially the same question, albeit in the 
context of a dissolution. McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. County of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (2017), 
concerned a married lesbian couple that planned for a child borne by one of them using 
donor sperm. Id. at 494. The couple executed a co-parenting agreement specifically 
contemplating the continuation of the relationship between the non-biological parent and 
child in the event of a break-up. Id. When the child was two, however, the couple split up 
and the biological mother attempted to prevent contact between her child and her ex-
partner, arguing that the Arizona presumption applied only to men. Id. at 495–96. The 
Arizona court, specifically rejecting the application of Nguyen while citing Obergefell, 
Pavan, and Morales-Santana, see infra notes 71–81 and accompanying text, determined 
that to save the statute’s constitutionality, it must apply the presumption equally to male 
and female spouses. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 500–02. 
 43. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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the adoption of a child, Jessica M., by her biological mother’s husband, 
whom the mother married eight months after Jessica’s birth.44 Jonathan 
Lehr, the putative biological father, argued that the adoption was invalid 
because he was never notified that the adoption petition had been filed.45 
New York, where the parties resided, maintained a “putative father 
registry.”46 A man who filed with that registry was entitled to notice before 
the adoption of the child whom he asserted he fathered, but Lehr never 
registered.47 Lehr could also have, but did not (according to the 
majority48), seek to have his paternity adjudicated, have his name inscribed 
on Jessica’s birth certificate, live openly with his daughter and hold 
himself out as the father, provide a sworn statement by the mother that he 
was the father, or marry Jessica’s mother.49 Additionally, Lehr did not 
provide Jessica or her mother with any financial support.50 Biological, 
unmarried mothers, the Court conceded, need not do anything under the 
statute to merit notice of adoption, and also need not do anything special 
to benefit from due process protections as a parent.51 Unmarried fathers, 
however, could be treated differently. The Court noted: 
[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child,’ . . . his interest in personal contact with his child 
acquires substantial protection under the due process clause . . . But the 
mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent 
constitutional protection.52 
The unwed mother’s biological relationship is sufficient to warrant due 
process protection, but the unwed father’s is not.53 Additionally, in the 
 
 44. See id. at 250. 
 45. See id.  
 46. Id. at 250–51. 
 47. Id.  
 48. The dissent provides a quite different statement of the facts. According to the 
dissent, Lehr made a genuine effort to support Jessica and her mother emotionally and 
financially, but the mother evaded contact, refused to accept money, and married another 
man before Lehr could secure his parentage. See id. at 268–70 (White, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 251–52 (majority opinion). 
 50. Id. at 252. Financial support was not a requirement of the state law, but it was a 
factor that the Court considered. Again, according to the dissent’s telling, Lehr offered 
support but was rebuffed. See id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 266–67. 
 52. Id. at 261 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979)). 
 53. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding a Georgia adoption 
law that dispensed with the need for consent of the unmarried, biological father). 
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absence of a “substantial relationship” between father and child, no equal 
protection problem arises.54 
Unmarried maternal primacy also infects immigration law, though 
recent developments may have muted the hierarchy. In Nguyen v. INS,55 
the Court upheld a requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) that governed conveyance of U.S. citizenship by unwed fathers to 
their children born abroad.56 An unwed father had to take an affirmative 
step in order to convey his citizenship that neither an unwed mother nor a 
married parent had to take. While his child is a minor, the unwed citizen 
father had to legitimate his child (i.e., by marrying the child’s mother), 
acknowledge his paternity in writing and under oath, or have his paternity 
established by a court.57 
The defendant, Tuan Anh Nguyen, was the son of Joseph Boulais—
an American citizen working for a military contractor in Vietnam—and a 
Vietnamese woman.58 Boulais brought Nguyen back to the United States 
and raised him, but never took any of the formal steps necessary to convey 
his citizenship.59 When Nguyen reached adulthood, he was convicted of 
 
 54. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266–68. 
 55. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3) (2012 & Supp. 2017).). Note the or; he had to take one of 
these three steps. 
 57. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53. 
 58. Id. at 57. 
 59. Id. According to Nguyen’s brief: 
Joseph Boulais, an American citizen by birth . . . lived in the United States 
continuously through his early adulthood . . . . In 1960, at age 23, Boulais 
enlisted in the United States Army. He served in Germany, receiving an 
honorable discharge in January 1963.  
 
Following his discharge from the army, Boulais relocated to Vietnam. In 
1969, while he was working for Pacific Architect Engineer, a military 
contractor, he began a relationship with a Vietnamese citizen, Hung Thi 
Nguyen. As a result of that relationship, Joseph Boulais’s son, Tuan Anh 
Nguyen (“Nguyen”), was born in Vietnam on September 11, 1969.  
 
Soon after his son’s birth, Boulais’s relationship with Hung Thi Nguyen 
soured. Thus, from early infancy, Tuan Anh Nguyen lived with his father, 
who later married another Vietnamese national. 
 
In 1975, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese troops. Six year-old Nguyen 
escaped from Vietnam with the family of Boulais’s wife. Within a few 
months, Nguyen was paroled into the United States as a refugee, and was 
reunited with Boulais. In the chaos surrounding the fall of Saigon and his 
family’s separation, Boulais lost contact with Nguyen’s biological mother. 
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crimes under state law and subject to deportation as a noncitizen.60 If 
Nguyen’s mother had been the U.S. citizen, Nguyen would have acquired 
her citizenship without the formal steps required of Boulais and would not 
be deportable. Consequently, Nguyen and Boulais launched an equal 
protection challenge based on sex. 
For five justices, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the fact of biological 
mothers necessarily being present at the time of birth meant that the sex-
based distinction was based on a “real” difference and therefore survived 
the equal protection challenge.61 The majority was persuaded that the sex-
based distinction substantially furthered two important purposes. First, the 
additional process ensured that the father was actually the father, unlike 
“[i]n the case of the mother, [where] the relation is verifiable from the birth 
itself.”62 Kennedy relied in part on the Lehr line of cases,63 which 
rationalized differential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers. Second, 
the sex-based distinction in the law afforded the child and citizen father an 
“opportunity . . . to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a 
formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties 
that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the 
United States.”64 For the mother and child, Kennedy thought, such an 
opportunity “inheres in the very event of birth.”65 The father, however, 
may not even know that the child exists due to the “9-month interval 
between conception and birth.”66 The law could, therefore, impose an 
additional step to facilitate the father-child relation. 
 
She never again communicated with Boulais, and he does not know whether 
she survived the war.  
 
Since 1975, Boulais, his wife and Nguyen have lived as a family in the 
United States. Nguyen adjusted his status to that of lawful permanent 
resident in 1975 pursuant to the Indochinese Refugee Act. He never 
returned to Vietnam. While Boulais provided financial support to Nguyen 
throughout his minority, he did not legitimate or otherwise formally 
establish his paternity prior to Nguyen’s 18th birthday. In 1997, Boulais 
underwent a DNA test confirming that Nguyen is indeed his son. 
Brief of Petitioners 4–5, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 60. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
 61. Id. at 73. 
 62. Id. at 62. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 64–65. 
 65. Id. at 65. 
 66. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas.67 Justice O’Connor came out 
swinging in dissent, incensed at the sexist stereotyping, and the more 
liberal justices (Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer) joined her.68 Justice 
Kennedy swatted away the charge of stereotyping,69 insisting that the 
difference in the law was based on biological reality and that to ignore it 
“would be to insist on a hollow neutrality.”70 
This very same Justice Kennedy, however, joined Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,71 which reached a 
contrary conclusion—it diminished the legal distinction between the 
maternal and paternal biological relationship in the immigration context. 
Morales-Santana involved a challenge to a subsection of the INA that 
imposed a ten-year residency requirement on unmarried fathers seeking to 
pass their U.S. citizenship to a child born abroad.72 In contrast, unmarried 
mothers needed only to reside in the United States for a single year to 
convey their citizenship.73 Luis Ramón Morales-Santana was born in the 
Dominican Republic to a U.S. citizen father and non-citizen mother; his 
parents were not married at the time of his birth and his father’s residency 
in the United States was short of the statutory requirement by twenty 
days.74 As a result, Morales-Santana did not derive citizenship from his 
father and crimes he committed under the laws of New York rendered him 
deportable.75 If the INA had applied a one-year residency requirement to 
unwed fathers as it did to mothers, Morales-Santana’s father would easily 
have satisfied the requirement and conveyed his U.S. citizenship to his 
son, thereby preventing the deportation. Morales-Santana challenged this 
sex-based distinction as a violation of equal protection. 
Justice Ginsburg reviewed the history of the relevant sections of the 
INA and found an underlying assumption that unwed mothers would 
 
 67. Id. at 56. 
 68. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 68 (majority opinion). 
 70. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64. 
 71. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 72. Id. at 1686. The statutory provision that applies to unwed U.S. citizen fathers is 8 
U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). That section refers back to 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012 
& Supp. 2017), where the rules for married citizens are set forth, and applies the same 
residency requirement. Congress has since shortened the requirement to five years, but the 
ten-year rule was in effect when Morales-Santana was born. 
 73. Unwed U.S. citizen mothers are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c). 
 74. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686. 
 75. Id. at 1688. 
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“natural[ly]” be their children’s “sole guardian.”76 She described that view 
as “stunningly anachronistic”77 and agreed with Morales-Santana that the 
statutory distinction between unwed citizen mothers and unwed citizen 
fathers violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.78 
All of the justices, besides Justice Kennedy, who were on the Court 
for both Nguyen and Morales-Santana, lined up the same way each time—
they either consistently saw an equal protection violation or consistently 
rejected the challenge. For Kennedy, however, there was evidently some 
basis for distinguishing between the two cases, though that basis is not 
readily identifiable. Put in its best light, the sex-based distinction in the 
law in Nguyen hewed closely to the biological facts of pregnancy and 
childbirth, while in Morales-Santana, the distinction relied on the 
assumption that unwed fathers disappear while unwed mothers wind up as 
“sole guardians.”79 The former is biology, and therefore “real,” while the 
latter is stereotyping. 
Under scrutiny, this distinction disintegrates. Both the paternity-
establishment requirement and the length of residency requirement emerge 
at some attenuation from the facts of pregnancy and childbirth. Even the 
rationale that the mother-child relation is evident from the birth falls apart 
once you consider that the assertion of citizenship in each case occurred 
years after and miles away from the birth.80 Both of these challenged 
 
 76. Id. at 1691–92. 
 77. Id. at 1693. 
 78. That was the good news for Morales-Santana. The bad news was that the majority 
determined that it would overstep judicial authority to award him citizenship as a remedy. 
Id. at 1698. Instead, the Court equalized unwed citizen mothers and fathers by invalidating 
the shortened requirement for mothers, which is framed in the law as an exception to the 
general rule. Id. at 1699. As a result, Morales-Santana was deportable as a noncitizen. Id. 
at 1699–1701. Until Congress takes steps to reduce the length of the residency requirement 
for all unwed citizen parents, the longer requirement governs. 
  Justice Ginsburg did not forget that unwed fathers must demonstrate their 
commitment to their children. Id. at 1692 n.12. Morales-Santana’s father, José Morales, 
supported his son, married the mother, and added his name to the birth certificate. Id. 
Though it reads as dictum, Ginsburg observed in a footnote—citing Lehr—that Morales 
“formally accepted parental responsibility for his son.” Id. 
 79. Id. at 1691.  
 80. Note that it was the birth, not the birth certificate, upon which Kennedy relied. If 
it were the birth certificate, it would erode the sex-based distinction in the law he upheld, 
requiring formality of both mothers and fathers. To stress this point, consider the French 
provision for anonymous childbirth. A French woman may deliver a child anonymously 
and request that her confidentiality be preserved. If, after two months, she does not reclaim 
the child, “the birth has never officially taken place.” BRUNO PERREAU, THE POLITICS OF 
ADOPTION: GENDER AND THE MAKING OF FRENCH CITIZENSHIP 172 n.94 (Deke Dusinberre 
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statutory provisions rely on some obscure alloy of biology and 
stereotyping.81 
Taken together, Nguyen, Morales-Santana, and Pavan, represent a 
rise, fall, and rise again of biological maternal primacy. Though the Court 
issued its decision in Morales-Santana a mere two weeks before it issued 
Pavan, and the two cases apparently represent the views of roughly the 
same justices (the same three justices dissented, so there was at least a four 
justice overlap in the majorities), the two decisions nonetheless point in 
opposite directions. Morales-Santana disrupts maternal primacy and 
Pavan entrenches it. Everyone was married in Pavan, so the Lehr strand 
that runs through Nguyen—according to which unwed fathers can be 
required to take steps not required of unwed mothers before enjoying 
parental rights—does not apply in Pavan unproblematically. Still, the 
current of biological maternal primacy courses through the set, excepting 
only Morales-Santana, where Justice Ginsburg—founder of the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project and architect of equal protection law based on 
sex—put her foot down. With Kennedy on Ginsburg’s side, Morales-
Santana could almost be read to suggest that biological maternal primacy 
is on the way out—but then came Pavan.82 
The pending case of a married, gay male couple, Andrew and Elad 
Dvash-Banks, who are seeking American citizenship for one of their twin 
sons, could represent a real push in one direction or the other.83 Andrew is 
a U.S. citizen and Elad is Israeli.84 A surrogate was implanted with 
 
trans., MIT Press 2014). In the absence of an official record establishing the maternal 
relationship, this law essentially puts an unidentified mother on the same footing as an 
unidentified father, notwithstanding biological differences.   
 81. By the time of Morales-Santana, perhaps Kennedy shed a little of the mother-
child romanticism that animated his opinions in such cases as Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007). In Gonzalez, Justice Kennedy, for the conservative side of the Court, 
upheld the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. Id. at 168. The case was rife with 
lamentations for an imagined pregnant woman’s grief over her abortion decision (“While 
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”). Id. at 159. Read together 
with Nguyen, it is hard not to discern a certain sentimentality on the part of Justice Kennedy 
regarding motherhood. 
 82. See infra Part II. Pavan relies on and entrenches biological maternal primacy by 
making the presumption of parentage a function of marriage to the biological mother. 
 83. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Dvash-Banks v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (No. 18-00523), https://www.immigrationequality.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Dvash-Banks-Complaint-Filed.pdf. 
 84. See id. at ¶ 1. Andrew has dual citizenship in Canada. See id. at ¶ 39. 
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anonymously donated ova fertilized with Andrew and Elad’s jointly 
supplied sperm; she gave birth to fraternal twins in Canada.85 One twin is 
genetically related to Andrew and the other is genetically related to Elad.86 
Only the former was granted U.S. citizenship by the U.S. Department of 
State.87 Officials treated the twins as “born out of wedlock.”88 A child of a 
heterosexual married couple where only one parent is a U.S. citizen—as 
we saw in Nguyen and Morales-Santana—is born with U.S. citizenship 
status if certain minimum residency requirements are met.89 This rule may 
originate in the assumption that the child is genetically related to both 
parents, but as we have seen, the parentage presumption, especially its 
applicability in the case of consented-to anonymous sperm donation, may 
mean that the child is genetically related only to one. Andrew and Elad 
seek to have their twins treated as born within wedlock.90 If the Dvash-
Banks case were to reach the U.S. Supreme Court and come out in favor 
of the couple and their son as an extension of Pavan, this would deal a 
blow to maternal primacy and edge the status of gay male parenthood 
closer to that of lesbian parenthood. 
I am not, however, sanguine on behalf of the Dvash-Banks family. 
Indeed, the most recent version of the Uniform Parentage Act (2017) 
(UPA),91 while making numerous changes in furtherance of gender equity, 
draws the line here: it maintains automatic parenting rights for a birth 
mother and then presumes parentage for the birth mother’s spouse,92 but 
the spouse of a male biological parent acquires no such presumption. 
While the surrogate in Dvash-Banks is making no claim to parentage, such 
policy tendencies as those represented in the UPA, as well as the politics 
of international surrogacy, cannot help but emerge as significant. As a 
result, we might expect to see a deepening conflict between gay male and 
feminist/maternal interests.93 
 
 85. See id. at ¶ 2. 
 86. See id. 
 87. The U.S. embassy in Toronto made the determination. See id. at ¶ 4.  
 88. See id. at ¶ 4. 
 89. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59; Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 
(2017). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 90. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 104, Dvash-Banks (No. 18-
00523). 
 91. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 92. See Joslin, supra note 42, at 609 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (a)(1)(A) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)). 
 93. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption 
of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 276 (2006) (“I would 
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As gay men form families and attempt to secure parenting rights, 
Pavan does them no favors and arguably impedes their progress by silently 
entrenching biological maternal primacy. Pavan grounds the second 
parent’s rights in marriage to the birth mother, whose rights go entirely 
unquestioned; birth mother rights serve as a premise rather than a 
conclusion. A married gay male couple cannot possibly be treated the 
same as a married heterosexual or lesbian couple unless and until the law 
dispenses with that remarkably durable—if barely visible—starting place. 
What would it mean to attack the tree at its root—the primacy of biological 
motherhood? 
 
IV. DE FACTO (AND OTHERWISE EQUITABLE) PARENTHOOD 
Legal scholars have for some time been envisioning an answer to that 
question. The prevailing line of argument seems to favor the interrelated 
contractual concepts of intent and function, increasing protections for 
parents who lack a biological connection to their child but who, 
particularly in the context of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), 
intended to parent and/or have functioned socially as a parent to an existing 
child. 
Perhaps the earliest scholar to become well-known for advocating 
this kind of position is Nancy Polikoff. Polikoff tuned in to the limitations 
of biology and marriage for lesbian couples long before those couples 
could marry or adopt. Going back decades, she authored numerous articles 
and a book advancing a version of family law that would recognize the 
relationships that are functionally central to people’s lives. In a 1990 
piece,94 Polikoff scanned existing doctrines recognizing non-biological, 
non-adoptive, parent-child relationships and extracted useful theories for 
advancing recognition of parent-child relationships based on intent and 
function. She highlighted equitable estoppel, explaining: 
 
find it impossible to conclude that the . . . pre-birth conduct [of two male co-parents] (or 
anyone else’s behavior during that time) could so overwhelm the parental contributions of 
the gestating woman that they would satisfy a functional test more certainly than she would. 
As a result, nothing in this functional analysis answers the question how, at the time of 
birth, a default rule could identify as a child’s two (and only two) parents a gay male 
couple . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 94. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood 
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 
GEO. L.J. 459 (1990). 
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[f]unctional parents—including lesbian parents—may develop a parent-
child relationship in several ways. A lesbian-mother family can hold 
itself out as including two mothers. It can treat a child as part of both 
mothers’ extended families. A child can have the last names of both 
mothers. A legally unrecognized mother can contribute to the child’s 
financial support and the legally recognized mother can accept such 
payment. A written or oral agreement can exist between the two women 
that they will jointly rear the child. Under any of these circumstances, 
the legally unrecognized mother should be able to seek the legal status 
of parent. She should be able to assert that by creating the parent-child 
relationship and representing that child rearing was a joint endeavor, the 
legally recognized mother has been estopped from denying the 
functional parent the status of legal parent.95 
Since the advent of same-sex marriage, Polikoff has also forcefully argued 
that marriage should not be a requirement in parentage determinations.96 
She has even warned against relying on adoption for non-biological 
parents.97 In distinguishing planned lesbian families from step-parent 
families secured by adoption, Polikoff urged that “[a] lesbian couple . . . 
plans for a child together. From before birth, the child-to-be has two 
parents. The nonbiological mother is not a step-parent.”98 Polikoff’s work 
consistently emphasizes the importance of consent99—meaning the formal 
or informal agreement between adults to co-parent—and function as 
evidence of consent.100 
Other legal scholars have followed Polikoff’s lead.101 In his 2012 
book, The Right to be Parents,102 Carlos Ball traced the evolution of the 
 
 95. Id. at 499. 
 96. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, The New Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the 
Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 
722 (2012); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER LAW 123 (2008). 
 97. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for the Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009). 
 98. Id. at 206. 
 99. See id. at 233. 
 100. See id. at 237–38. 
 101. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002) 
(developing the concept of intent to parent and arguing that “the law should understand 
intentional parenthood as subsumed by the notion of functional parenthood” for married 
and unmarried people). Id. at 602. 
 102. CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD (2012). This book was dedicated in part to Nancy 
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law granting or denying recognition to LGBT parents. Some of the stories 
Ball recounts are harrowing, as legal standards rooted in unfounded 
stereotypes and formalistic reliance on biology and marriage, threaten, and 
in many cases destroy, emotional ties. In the progress toward recognition 
of planned gay and lesbian-headed families, the increasing significance of 
intent, consent, and function all feature prominently in Ball’s account.103 
Douglas NeJaime has provided the most current and 
comprehensively argued scholarship urging lawmakers and judges not to 
“deny the importance of biological ties, but simply . . . to credit social 
contributions as well” when making decisions about parental 
recognition.104 Specifically, NeJaime favors placing an increased value 
“on factors such as intent to parent, parental conduct, and family 
formation.”105 “Same-sex family formation,” NeJaime observes, “features 
a parent without a genetic or gestational connection to the child; therefore, 
treating same-sex parents as equals demands recognition on social 
grounds.”106 
In a related article carefully tracing progress for gays and lesbians in 
both marriage and parenting domains, NeJaime persuasively argued 
“marriage equality can facilitate the expansion of intentional and 
functional parentage principles across family law — not only inside but 
also outside marriage, for both same-sex and different-sex couples.”107 
NeJaime methodically demonstrated how LGBT advocates shrewdly drew 
from case law recognizing biological but non-marital fathers as well as 
 
Polikoff. See also Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate In Former Partner 
Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 623, 656–61 (2012) (arguing that intent is not a sufficient guide without function). 
 103. See BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS, supra note 102, at 83–114. 
 104. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2264. See also BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE 
PARENTS, supra note 102, at 139 (explaining that “[i]t is important . . . to distinguish the 
argument that biology should not be solely determinative of parenthood from the 
contention that biology should be irrelevant to that question. Supporters of lesbian and gay 
parenting have never made the latter claim . . . . [A] biological link should be neither 
necessary nor sufficient to claim parentage status.”). 
 105. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2264.  
 106. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2268. Note that biological maternity can be 
fragmented into genetic and gestational. Fertile women for whom carrying a fetus presents 
particular risks may resort to surrogacy for gestation only. Further, some lesbian couples 
have divided biological responsibilities in order to feel that both mothers have contributed 
to the production of a child. See AMY HEQUEMBOURG, LESBIAN MOTHERHOOD: STORIES OF 
BECOMING 74 (2007). 
 107. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185, 1190 (2016) [hereinafter NeJaime, New Parenthood]. 
ADLER - FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2018  4:52 PM 





sperm donor cases recognizing marital but non-biological fathers to 
reinvent parenthood on functional grounds.108 Pressing for de facto 
parenthood featured prominently in this strategy.109 
Massachusetts is among those U.S. jurisdictions to have ratified the 
de facto parent doctrine,110 which affords a custody or visitation claim to 
a non-biological, non-adoptive parental figure who 
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the 
legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions . . . The de facto 
parent shapes the child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental needs, 
disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care, and 
serves as a moral guide.111 
One of the two cases in which this doctrine was incorporated into 
Massachusetts law, E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,112 concerned a child born through 
 
 108. See id. at 1193, 1196. 
 109. See id. at 1199. 
 110. For an assessment of each state’s degree of acceptance of the doctrine, see De 
Facto Parent Recognition, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-parents-de-facto.pdf.  
 111. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).  
 112. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). The other was Youmans v. 
Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999), which involved an appeal by a child’s father from a 
court order of visitation with a maternal aunt who had served as the child’s sole guardian 
for most of the child’s life. Youmans preceded E.N.O. by a week. The court in Youmans 
invoked the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, as 
follows:  
We use the terms “legal parent” and “de facto parent” proposed by the 
Reporters on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. See ALI 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(l) (Tent. Draft No. 3 
Part 1 1998) (approved at annual meeting May, 1998). The definition of “de 
facto parent” states in relevant part:  
“A de facto parent is an adult, not the child’s legal parent, who for a 
period that is significant in light of the child’s age, developmental 
level, and other circumstances,  
“(i) has resided with the child, and  
“(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with 
the consent of a legal parent to the formation of a de facto parent 
relationship . . . regularly has performed  
“(I) a majority of the caretaking functions for the child.”  
Youmans, 711 N.E.2d at 167 n.3. 
Observe the similarity of this doctrine to the estoppel doctrine proposed by Polikoff. Both 
are equitable doctrines and they rely on roughly the same factors. Note also that in some 
states, the de facto parent is effectively put on equal footing with, or perhaps becomes, a 
legal parent, while in other states the de facto parent has a visitation but not a custody claim 
against a legal parent. Some states have rejected equitable parenting doctrines altogether 
as a violation of the legal parent’s constitutional prerogatives. See Grossman, supra note 
13, at 333–39; see also Feinberg, supra note 42, at 66–68 (explaining the variation among 
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artificial insemination to a lesbian couple. The partner who was not 
inseminated had no legal relation to the biological mother or child.113 
Marriage was not yet available to same-sex couples, and the couple had 
launched, but not completed, the process of adoption before their 
relationship deteriorated.114 
The facts of E.N.O. were ideally suited to instituting the doctrine of 
de facto parenthood. The couple had planned for one of them to conceive 
and “executed a coparenting agreement” that “expressed the parties’ intent 
that the [biological mother’s partner] retain her parental status even if the 
[couple] were to separate.”115 The biological mother’s partner cared for the 
biological mother throughout the pregnancy, acted as her birthing coach, 
cut the umbilical cord, and took primary financial and domestic 
responsibility while the biological mother was ill.116 The child addressed 
the two women as “Mommy” and “Mama.”117 
When the child was three, the adults’ relationship ended and the 
biological mother attempted to terminate contact between her ex-partner 
and child.118 The ex-partner went to court seeking specific enforcement of 
the co-parenting agreement, including leave to adopt the child and 
establishment of a custody and visitation order.119 The trial judge denied 
the biological mother’s motion to dismiss and established a temporary 
 
jurisdictions as to whether the legal parent is on the same footing as the de facto, or 
otherwise equitable, parent). Carlos Ball has argued that once a person is deemed a de facto 
parent, courts should treat that person the same as the legal parent. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE 
PARENTS, supra note 102, at 114. The latest version of the UPA (2017) includes a de facto 
parenthood provision according to which de facto parents, once adjudicated as such, “can 
be recognized as legal parents who stand in parity with any other legal parents, including 
genetic parents, for all purposes.” Joslin, supra note 42, at 602 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)). 
 113. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 888–89. 
 114. Id. at 889. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 888–89. 
 117. Id. at 889. 
 118. Id. Gay and lesbian civil rights lawyers came to call this sadly familiar scenario 
“lesbians behaving badly.” Cf. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS, supra note 102, at 89, 
102 (discussing how the major LGBT advocacy organizations decided that even though 
cases like these typically involve two gay or lesbian people, the pro-gay position was to 
represent de facto parents against biological parents who terminated contact between their 
ex-lovers and their children, and—when representing lesbians going through dissolution 
processes—to refuse to argue that non-biological, functional parents had no standing 
because they lacked a biological relation to a child). 
 119. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889. 
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visitation order “in the child’s best interests.”120 The order was vacated by 
a judge on the Massachusetts Appeals Court, reinstated by a single justice 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), and then affirmed by 
the full court.121 
To reach its conclusion, the SJC had to overcome a significant hurdle. 
Just a few years before, it had come to the opposite result in a nearly 
identical case, C.M. v. P.R.122 In C.M., the non-biological parent had 
resided with the mother and child and performed every parental 
function.123 When his relationship with the mother ended and the mother 
attempted to terminate contact between him and the child, he sought 
visitation and an order of paternity but lost.124 C.M. differed from E.N.O. 
in two respects: first, the plaintiff in C.M. was a man, and second, the 
plaintiff in C.M. “had not been part of the decision to create a family by 
bringing the child into the world.”125 
Justice Fried of the Massachusetts SJC126 dissented in E.N.O. and 
charged the majority with subterfuge, noting that while purporting to apply 
the best interest standard, the majority was actually enforcing a contract 
between the parties and was doing so because the case involved a same-
sex couple.127 The majority never explicitly stated that it was granting 
specific enforcement of the co-parenting agreement,128 but it did find that 
the agreement “revealed [the parents’] beliefs regarding the child’s best 
interests.”129 Fried argued that the “parties’ . . . agreements . . . ha[d] no 
bearing on determining the child’s best interests but only . . . the 
expectations of the mother’s former partner.”130 Indeed, when the majority 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 888. 
 122. C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995). 
 123. Id. at 154–55. 
 124. Id. at 155. 
 125. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891. 
 126. Charles Fried has long since returned to his academic post at Harvard Law School. 
See Charles Fried Faculty Profile, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10288/Fried (last visited July 15, 2018).  
 127. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 895–96 (Fried, J., dissenting). 
 128. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004), specifically disclaiming the 
existence of “parenthood by contract” in Massachusetts. This case occurred in the context 
of a lesbian dissolution in which the plaintiff sued her ex-partner for child support for a 
child she conceived using anonymously donated sperm. Id. at 1246. The claim was based 
on an implied contract. Id.  No biological, adoptive, or de facto parenting relationship 
existed between the child and the defendant. Id. 
 129. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 892. 
 130. Id. at 896 (Fried, J., dissenting). 
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defended itself by arguing that the agreement was not being specifically 
enforced but merely read to inform the court of the parties’ belief about 
best interests, it set up a syllogism. If a co-parenting agreement, ostensibly 
supplanted by a best-interest analysis, effectively determines best interest, 
then the court’s best interest determination can hardly be differentiated 
from specific enforcement. Moreover, Fried reasoned, “events occurring 
during the child’s life are more relevant to the child’s well-being than 
decisions or arrangements concluded between the mother and her partner 
before the child’s birth.”131 The co-parenting agreement should have been 
irrelevant, and the plaintiffs in C.M. and E.N.O., Fried concluded, should 
have been treated the same.132 
The child’s best interest in E.N.O. happily coincided with the 
intentions of the two women and the functional role that the non-biological 
mother played in the child’s life. This enabled the SJC to point to best 
interests while enforcing the understanding of the parties. The importance 
of Fried’s dissent, however, is that it reveals de facto parenthood to be, in 
the end, a creature of contract.133 The non-biological mother’s de facto 
parent status was predicated on a combination of the co-parenting 
agreement and the facts of the child’s rearing, including function and the 
biological parent’s consent. The former is an express contract, and the 
latter is a contract implied in fact.134 This is precisely the direction in which 
scholars of gay and lesbian family law have been pushing. Rather than 
determining parenthood status based foremost on biology, scholars of gay 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 896–97. 
 133. It is worth noting that while contracts cannot, according to established law, 
override a child’s best interest, agreements regarding custody and support are approved by 
courts all the time, so long as the child’s best interest is not compromised. See, e.g., In re 
Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ohio 2011) (recognizing that a legal parent can share 
custody with a non-legal parent by agreement).  
Further, two phases of judicial deliberation are to be distinguished: (1) determination of 
parentage, i.e., who has the status of parent and therefore is vested with due process rights; 
and (2) what the custody arrangements will be. Theoretically, the latter is determined by 
the best interest standard, not the former. De facto parenthood is doctrinally awkward, 
because it does not fit perfectly into one of these two distinct phases. In E.N.O., the 
biological mother argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction even to consider the non-
biological mother’s claim because only the biological mother was a parent. E.N.O., 711 
N.E.2d at 889–90. The SJC determined that the trial court properly exercised its broad 
equitable jurisdiction based on the child’s best interest—a determination that ordinarily 
would be expected to come later, in the second phase. Id. at 890. 
 134. “A promise that is implied in fact is merely a tacit promise, one that is inferred in 
whole or in part from expressions other than words on the part of a promisor.” 1 JOSEPH 
M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1.18 (rev. ed. 1993). 
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and lesbian family law would have courts examine the intentions of the 
same-sex couple, the non-biological parent’s performance of parenting 
functions, and the biological parent’s consent to the non-biological 
parent’s performance of those functions. In other words, scholars seek a 
move from status to contract. Have we seen this anywhere before? 
 
V. FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT 
“[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from Status to Contract.”135 So wrote Sir Henry Sumner Maine 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, giving us an axiom, albeit one the 
meaning and accuracy of which is the subject of some dispute.136 By 
status, Maine meant “the particular place into which an individual had 
been born as part of a given family or kinship group exhaustively 
determined that individual’s legal standing: their prospects of trade and 
marriage and the entitlement to decide what happened to their property 
after death.”137 Contemporary authors observe that “‘[s]tatus’ today is used 
in a broader sense than Maine had originally intended. It has come to be 
understood as encompassing both ‘ascribed’ and ‘achieved’ conditions”138 
such as employer or employee, which—if in one sense a “status”—is 
nonetheless “achieved” by contract.139 Maine, however, was explicit that 
in his usage, the term did not refer “to such conditions as are the immediate 
or remote result of agreement . . . .”140 
 
 135. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Beacon Press 1863) 
(1861). 
 136. See, e.g., Robert Redfield, Maine’s Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive Society, 
2 W. POL. Q. 574, 577 (criticizing Maine on anthropological grounds); Bernard S. Cohn, 
From Indian Status to British Contract, 21 J. ECON. HIST. 613, 628 (1961) (observing that 
the axiom derives from the limited context studied by Maine). 
 137. Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to 
Contract and Back Again?, 65 AMER. J. COMP. L., 145, 151 (2017).  
 138. Id. at 148; see also J. Russell VerSteeg, From Status to Contract: A Contextual 
Analysis of Maine’s Famous Dictum, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 669, 677 (1989) (lamenting the 
over-interpretation of Maine’s concept of status by commentators). 
 139. Cf. R.H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. REV. 261, 
267–270 (1941) (demonstrating the imperfection of the categories and arguing that 
regulation of industry and corporations, including relationship of employer to employee, 
represented a shift back in the direction of status). 
 140. MAINE, supra note 135, at 165. 
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According to Maine’s view, even marriage did not count as a status 
because it is achieved.141 Maine’s conception of status is derived 
principally from the conditions of one’s birth.142 His exclusion of marriage 
came under particular criticism due to extensive changes in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century that affected the rights of married women.143 Moreover, 
as evidenced by Lord Mansfield’s Rule, marriage effectively determined 
paternity prior to the advent of genetic testing, as legitimacy was a status 
determined by whether one was born to a marriage. Marriage, one could 
therefore say, was always a hidden feature of status in Maine’s work. Still, 
in the limited sense in which Maine used the term, e.g., being born female, 
a slave, an eldest son, etc., status was what determined a person’s rights 
and obligations in the least evolved legal systems. 
Though Maine’s axiom was descriptive, he also viewed the shift from 
status to contract as progress. As the appointed “Anglo-Indian 
Administrator,” Maine spent most of the 1860s “tasked with replacing 
[India’s] alleged status based social order with Western-style legal rules” 
favoring individual autonomy.144 He viewed the move as evidence of an 
improving “moral consciousness.”145 
Advocates of an increased role for intent and function in parentage 
determinations are effectively pushing for the same kind of progress 
heralded by Maine. Contractual concepts such as these would increasingly 
alter parenthood so that sex, biology, and marriage would be drained of 
determinative power in favor of individual autonomy, manifested in pre-
birth co-parenting agreements and contracts implied in fact. Like Maine, 
contemporary scholars of gay and lesbian family law regard the shift as 
both an apt description of how progress for gay and lesbian people has 
occurred and a prescription for further advancement.146 
 
 141. Graveson, supra note 139, at 262. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 262, 267. On the demise of coverture, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: 
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 52–55 (2000). 
 144. Schmidt, supra note 137, at 151–52. 
 145. Id. at 151. 
 146. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2268; NeJaime, New Parenthood, supra note 
107, at 1196. 
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VI. CONTRACTUAL BASES FOR GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTHOOD: A 
FEW CAUTIONARY THOUGHTS 
Reliance on biology cannot help but disadvantage persons in same-
sex couples who intend to co-parent with a biological parent. Moreover, 
reliance on marriage as a guide to parental rights poses risks to the 
unmarried, and maternal primacy as the key determinative factor erects 
obstacles for men, both gay and straight. For these reasons, a shift towards 
intent and function may well hold the most promise for many gay and 
lesbian would-be parents. Still, it is worth pausing to consider the hazards 
associated with this form of advancement. 
A.  Remembering Critiques of Contract 
In some fields, such as the law of consumer credit,147 the increasing 
importance of contract has proven disadvantageous to weaker parties. 
Consumers, who are less savvy than credit card companies and have little 
to no input into the terms of their credit card contracts, can find themselves 
contending with unexpected increases in interest rates, waivers of rights to 
judicial relief in favor of forced arbitration, and mysterious fees.148 
In the context of family relations, a number of legal writers have 
proposed a shift toward contract, with the hope that such a move would 
enhance freedom and autonomy and offer the possibility of equalizing 
heterosexual relations.149 Not all scholars of family law, however, are 
optimistic about the promise of contract to deliver these benefits. Some 
have expressed the concern that weaker family members face inequities 
analogous to those faced by consumers and other disadvantaged 
bargainers. As Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley have argued, 
 
 147. See generally Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms 
for Regulating Consumer Credit, 73 TENN. L. REV. 303 (2006) (discussing the role of 
bargaining power in the consumer credit industry). 
 148. See id. at 335–37. 
 149. See generally MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015). 
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While private ordering has liberating aspects, it also entails more 
worrisome implications. The assumption that bargains will be freely 
struck masks configurations of social power that provide the backdrop to 
any contracts. Generations of labor leaders have pointed out the fallacy 
of assuming that workers and employers were equally free bargaining 
agents.150 
The problem is that “[c]ontractual ordering does not alter those 
background economic and social conditions that curtail the freedom of 
some and enhance that of others, that create relationships of domination 
and subordination between men and women as well as between rich and 
poor.”151 
Prenuptial agreements, which enable divorcing spouses to supplant 
state law with privately negotiated terms, have been lauded by some as 
furthering individual autonomy and shedding antiquated notions of 
women’s inability to bargain for their own interests.152 Some feminists, 
however, have remained skeptical. As one writer observed, “premarital 
agreements generally disadvantage the economically vulnerable spouse by 
precluding the protections offered by state law . . . .”153 Available data 
“strongly suggests that premarital agreements generally harm women and 
the children in their care.”154 Older men often enter such agreements with 
their younger brides, who have far less wealth and bargaining power in 
any negotiation.155 
In the domain of same-sex parenting, the risks of relying on contract 
theory may have less to do with unfair terms negotiated under conditions 
of unequal bargaining power and more to do with the question of 
enforcement—i.e., whether a contract is found to exist in the first place. A 
seminal article by Clare Dalton illustrates this danger.156 Dalton highlights 
the nineteenth-century Pennsylvania case of Hertzog v. Hertzog,157 where 
“an adult son lived and worked with his father until his father’s death, at 
 
 150. Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: 
Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 11 (1996). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990). 
 153. Gail F. Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
229, 238 (1994). 
 154. Id. at 241. 
 155. See id. at 243. 
 156. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 
997 (1985). 
 157. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857). 
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which point the son sued the estate for compensation for services 
rendered.”158 The question in the case was whether the father’s estate owed 
a contractual obligation to compensate the son, John.159 A witness 
“testified that he ‘heard the old man say he would pay John for the labour 
he had done.’”160 The jury understood these words to indicate the existence 
of a contract, but the estate appealed the jury’s decision and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the testimony quite differently.161 The 
court found that “[t]his is no making of a contract or admission of one; but 
rather the contrary. It admits that the son deserved some reward, but not 
that he had a contract for any.”162 To reach this conclusion, the court read 
the words in light of the father-son relationship, explaining 
If we find . . . that a stranger has been in the employment of another, we 
immediately infer a contract for hiring . . . . But if we find a son in the 
employment of his father . . . we do not infer a contract of hiring, because 
the principle of family affection is sufficient to account for the family 
association, and does not demand the inference of a contract.163 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the witness testimony through the 
filter of a preconceived notion about the nature of father-son relationships; 
namely, that father-son relationships are not ones of contractual 
exchange.164 The existence of a contract, Dalton argued, was rooted in a 
judicial understanding of the relational context in which the events 
occurred.165 
Judicial conceptions of interpersonal relationships pose obvious 
dangers to gay and lesbian people, whose intimate partnerships have too 
often been viewed by judges as roommate relationships or improper 
relations. Intent is only as good as its signifiers, and its signifiers are only 
as good as their interpreter. 
Of course, judicial goggles can facilitate or impede recognition of 
gay and lesbian familial intent, and in our current historical moment of 
increasing equality, it might not be the hurdle it once was. State courts’ 
willingness to recognize de facto parents was testament to a judicial 
 
 158. Dalton, supra note 156, at 1015 (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 465). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 465). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 1017 (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 470). 
 163. Id. (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 469). 
 164. See id. at 1017. 
 165. See id. at 1017–18. 
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disposition to view gay and lesbian relationships in a tolerant light well 
before Obergefell. 
This kind of attitudinal shift has also occurred in other contexts. In 
the pivotal 1976 case of Marvin v. Marvin,166 the California Supreme 
Court ushered in new tolerance for the reality of non-marital cohabitation. 
A longstanding common law doctrine prohibited enforcement of so-called 
“meretricious contracts” where sex formed part of the consideration.167 In 
Marvin, a woman who had cohabited with a man for seven years before 
being kicked out of his house sought a share of property accumulated 
solely in the man’s name over the course the relationship.168 Lacking the 
protections of marriage, she asserted express and implied contract claims 
based on her career sacrifices and household contributions and his alleged 
promise to support her169—claims that might have been expected to fail 
given the intimate nature of the relationship and the ban on meretricious 
contracts. The California Supreme Court permitted her claims to proceed, 
however, based “on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together 
and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other 
persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights . . . [s]o 
long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious 
consideration.”170 
The Marvin court urged other courts to keep up with changing 
attitudes and practices. The court stated that “we believe that the 
prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and the social 
acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no 
means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious 
relationship to the instant case.”171 The court further stated that “[t]he 
mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to 
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral 
considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so 
many.”172 Conceding these grounds for its decision, the California court 
 
 166. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976). 
 167. See id. at 116. 
 168. Id. at 110. 
 169. See id. at 111–12, 116. 
 170. Id. at 116. The plaintiff in Marvin, while prevailing on the motion to dismiss, 
eventually lost on the merits. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981).  
 171. Marvin, 18 P.2d at 122. 
 172. Id. 
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cleared the way for the plaintiff to advance claims of both express and 
implied contract. 
The E.N.O. court made a nearly identical statement when it 
recognized the de facto parent. Specifically, the E.N.O. court stated: 
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the 
modern family. An increasing number of same gender couples, like the 
plaintiff and the defendant, are deciding to have children. It is to be 
expected that children of nontraditional families, like other children, 
form parent relationships with both parents, whether those parents are 
legal or de facto.173 
Justice Fried saw this as a tell that belied the pretense of not having 
enforced the co-parenting agreement.174 Read in a more favorable light, 
this statement was a frank admission by the majority of the values it 
brought to its deliberations. 
Judicial values can also cut the other way, as demonstrated by 
Dalton.175 Contrast Hewitt v. Hewitt,176 a decision issued out of Illinois just 
three years after Marvin. Hewitt concerned facts similar to those in 
Marvin, but the Illinois court held very different views toward the 
increasingly widespread practice of non-marital cohabitation. Squashing 
any possibility of a contractual claim, that court wondered: 
Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from 
conventional marriages can be acquired by those who deliberately 
choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred to as 
“illicit” or “meretricious” relationships encourage formation of such 
relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based 
society?177 
The decision suggests that the Hewitt court’s answer was yes. 
If contractual concepts such as intent and function are to gain 
determinative power at the expense of status-based concepts such as 
biological relation, marriage, and sex, we have to be prepared for the range 
of biases that inevitably will flow through the process of parentage 
 
 173. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999). 
 174. See id. at 895 (Fried, J., dissenting). 
 175. See Dalton, supra note 156, at 1017–18. 
 176. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
 177. Id. at 1207. 
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determinations.178 As Jessica Feinberg has argued, the advent of same-sex 
marriage and the opening of avenues to gay and lesbian adoption may lead 
some lawmakers and judges “to conclude that now that such parents have 
access to formal avenues to establishing legal parent status, equity no 
longer requires application or adoption of equitable parenthood 
doctrines;”179 i.e., where the parties have not married or adopted, same-sex 
intimate partnerships and gay and lesbian co-parents are at risk of not 
being recognized for what they are. This is a legitimate concern. 
The contrary possibility is worth considering, as well. Some courts 
might, in their zeal to find parental rights and responsibilities, sometimes 
assign them where they were not intended. In a story entitled What Makes 
a Parent?, Ian Parker told the harrowing tale of a lesbian in New York 
City who adopted a child after breaking up with her lover.180 The two 
women remained close, and the ex-lover spent time with the child and 
grew attached.181 The day the mother was due to move with her child to 
her native England, she was summoned to court to respond to a petition 
from her ex-lover asserting parentage.182 Every conceivable email and 
witness account of the relationship between the women, the relationship 
between the ex-lover and child, and the extent to which the women 
characterized themselves as family, was entered into evidence.183 While 
the court found against the petitioner, it did take the child’s passport and 
force the mother to endure a lengthy, costly, and terrifying trial.184 
Such a case could easily have been reversed. The mother could have 
sought a declaration of parentage and a child support order from her ex-
lover, who might never have intended to be a parent but nonetheless 
functioned enough like one to capture the court’s imagination.185 As 
 
 178. Another way to frame this is that status rooted in biology provides a rule, while 
questions of intent and function are determined by reference to standards, and are therefore 
more discretionary (though the application of rules and their exceptions can admit judicial 
discretion, as well). See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (exploring the distinction between legal rules 
and standards). 
 179. Feinberg, supra note 42, at 57. 
 180. See Ian Parker, What Makes a Parent?, THE NEW YORKER (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/22/what-makes-a-parent.  
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. The article concludes with an appeal pending. See id. 
 185. So far, the trend has not been in favor of courts assigning child support duties 
without a biological link, though nothing precludes a turn in that direction as contractual 
concepts gain more and more traction. Still, surveying the case law, Leslie Joan Harris 
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Duncan Kennedy has shown, the orthodoxy of intent as the basis of 
obligation can be followed by findings of “implied intent” and the 
assignment of duties implied in fact or in law.186 Doctrinal evolution in 
this direction effectively substitutes judicial assessments of moral 
obligation for private intentions. 
To the extent that gay and lesbian parenting rights increasingly rely 
on contract, critiques of contract should be on our radar. Issues of 
bargaining power, indeterminacy of judicial decision-making, and the 
slippage between intent and “implied intent” are all worth careful 
attention. 
B. Norm Production and the Diverse Gay and Lesbian Community 
My primary concern, however, is that the gay and lesbian community 
is diverse, and not everyone is likely to advance on the same terms. We 
should turn a more scrutinizing eye to the question of how exactly intent 
and function are understood. Homophobic readings are not the only hazard 
for which we ought to be on the lookout. What aspects of intentional and 
functional parenting relationships will surface as determinative? As 
advocates pursue what has emerged as the consensus strategic direction, 
what norms187 have they been generating along the way? Who within the 
gay and lesbian community is most likely to benefit from those norms and 
who is at risk of exclusion? 
 
observed, “biological parenthood is usually controlling when the issue is liability for child 
support. Functioning as a parent is considered, if at all, only when the primary issue is 
custody or access to a child.” Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the 
Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009). 
 186. DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 163–67 
(2006), https://bit.ly/2LIPoX7.  
 187. I invoke the term “norm” according to its usage in critical social thought, 
especially by Michel Foucault, Michael Warner, and Janet Halley. A norm is a fulcrum, or 
as Halley explains, a “distinction” or “standard” around which a “social, conceptual, and 
ethical field” is organized. Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: 
Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
97, 100 n.7 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001). The term here is meant to 
probe how specific aspects of relationships—e.g., whether an adult has financially 
supported a child—have (or will) come to define what it means to be an intentional and/or 
functional parent, so that the equitable concept of parenthood turns on specific relational 
factors that may not be equally accessible across the internally diverse gay and lesbian 
population. 
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A standout in the lineage of the family’s functional definition is the 
case Miguel Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company.188 The events of this 
case took place during the peak of the AIDS crisis for gay men in New 
York City. Leslie Blanchard was the tenant of record in a rent-controlled 
apartment.189 When he died, his longtime intimate partner, Miguel 
Braschi, wished to stay.190 The landlord, however, had an incentive to 
evict, as the rent control law provided for “vacancy decontrol”—that is, a 
return to market-based rent after a tenant vacates the premises.191 If the 
tenant of record died, “noneviction protection” extended to the “surviving 
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased 
tenant’s family who ha[d] been living with the tenant.”192 Decades before 
the advent of same-sex marriage in New York, the court had to determine 
whether Braschi was a member of Blanchard’s family. 
 The sympathetic New York court marshaled the facts to make the 
case that he was, noting that: 
Appellant and Blanchard lived together as permanent life partners for 
more than 10 years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by 
friends and family, as spouses. The two men’s families were aware of 
the nature of the relationship, and they regularly visited each other’s 
families and attended family functions together, as a couple. . .. 
[A]ppellant’s tenancy was known to the building’s superintendent and 
doormen, who viewed the two men as a couple. 
Financially, the two men shared all obligations including a household 
budget. The two were authorized signatories of three safe-deposit boxes, 
they maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit 
cards. In fact, rent was often paid with a check from their joint checking 
account. Additionally, Blanchard executed a power of attorney in 
appellant’s favor so that appellant could make necessary decisions—
financial, medical and personal—for him during his illness. Finally, 
appellant was the named beneficiary of Blanchard’s life insurance 
policy, as well as the primary legatee and coexecutor of Blanchard’s 
estate.193 
 
 188. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
 189. Id. at 50. 
 190. Id. at 50–51. 
 191. See id. at 52 (explaining the structure of the New York City rent control law). 
 192. Id. (quoting now-abrogated New York City regulation). 
 193. Id. at 55. 
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Braschi was an early and important victory for the recognition of same-
sex relationships based on their functional reality, but whose relationships 
are most easily seen by this standard? 
The first and second paragraphs emphasize the recognition that 
Braschi and Blanchard were fortunate to have from their families and 
people in their building. Not everyone enjoys this kind of community 
support, though we can hope that with time, more and more will. In the 
meantime, gay and lesbian people living in the “closet,” or even in an 
environment where such easy recognition is less common, will have one 
less argument. 
The third paragraph raises what may be a more intransigent concern. 
Financial support and interdependence has surfaced as an important factor 
in functional family law cases. Braschi and Blanchard jointly held all 
manner of accounts and safe-deposit boxes.194 The briefs stressed this 
evidence of their interdependence. As amicus, Lambda described such 
accounts as “financial necessities of life,”195 despite the fact that plenty of 
people do not have them. 
The non-biological parent in E.N.O. financially supported her family, 
and this counted in her favor in the de facto parenthood assessment.196 
Paternity cases going back at least to Lehr specifically look to financial 
support when determining a biological, non-marital father’s rights, so this 
factor has a sturdy lineage. While financially supporting one’s partner or 
children undoubtedly evidences one’s sense of responsibility toward them, 
it is much easier to point to this evidence when one has a regular and 
substantial income. Unemployed and low-income people, as recent critics 
of the child support regime have argued, often cannot afford to provide 
regular support.197 Poor people with court-ordered child support 
obligations often become trapped in mounting debt, including interest and 
penalties, and may even find themselves behind bars.198 Against this 
 
 194. See id. 
 195. Brief Amicus Curiae of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant 4, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-
87) (on file with author). Lambda also pointed to the fact that the couple had “traveled 
together extensively.” Id. Obviously, extensive travel is less likely in the case of a low-
income couple and may also prove difficult for mixed immigration-status families.  
 196. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999). 
 197. See Libby Adler & Janet Halley, You Pay, You Play: Feminists and Child Support 
Enforcement in the United States, in JANET HALLEY, PRABHA KOTISWARAN, HILA SHAMIR, 
& RACHEL REBOUCHÉ, GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE FIELD (forthcoming, U. 
Minn. Press 2019). 
 198. Id. 
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reality, reliance on a history of financial support for non-legal parents is 
likely to damage the interests of low-income would-be de facto parents. 
Relatedly, Braschi and Blanchard had access to costly professionals 
to prepare their wills and powers of attorney. For low-income sectors of 
the community, it is difficult to generate this kind of evidence of functional 
coupledom. The same holds true for co-parenting agreements, assuming 
they are executed with the benefit of legal advice and/or drafting. 
Undoubtedly, such instruments are the strongest evidence of joint 
planning, but that kind of evidence can be pricey. 
Indeed, the criterion of planning itself, emphasized in E.N.O. in order 
to distinguish C.M.,199 may disadvantage low-income and African-
American gay and lesbian people. Assisted reproductive technologies and 
private (including international) adoptions are cost-prohibitive for low-
income people. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that low-income 
and African-American same-sex families are in fact less likely to be 
planned. According to the Williams Institute, African-American gay and 
lesbian people are concentrated in locales outside of the urban coastal 
areas.200 Same-sex couples living in the South, Midwest, or Mountain 
states are more likely than their counterparts in coastal cities to be raising 
children, but less likely to be raising adopted children,201 which is “likely 
reflective of . . . different sex relationships earlier in life.”202 Planning, it 
seems, may be a class-based, racially, and regionally selective luxury.203 
The Braschi court also indicated that one of the factors to be 
considered in determining whether a non-marital intimate partner was 
“family” for purposes of protection against eviction was the “exclusivity 
and longevity” of the relationship.204 The E.N.O. court, too, in determining 
 
 199. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891–92. 
 200. Amira Hasenbush, Andrew R. Flores, Angeliki Kastanis, Brad Sears & Gary J. 
Gates, The LGBT Divide: A Data Portrait of LGBT People in the Midwestern, Mountain 
& Southern States, UCLA WILLIAMS INST. 7 (Dec. 2014), https://williamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-divide-Dec-2014.pdf; Angeliki Kastanis & Gary 
J. Gates, LGBT African-Americans and African-American Same-Sex Couples, UCLA 
WILLIAMS INST. (Oct. 2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-
demographics-studies/lgbt-african-american-oct-2013/. 
 201. Hasenbush et al., supra note 200, at 2.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Jessica Feinberg has made a similar point with regard to formal methods of 
attaining parenthood status, such as marriage and adoption. See Feinberg, supra note 42, 
at 91–95. This is an important point, but should be recognized as an equally significant 
issue in the context of de facto parenthood. 
 204. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989). The brief for the 
New York City Bar Association, written in part by well-known LGBT advocate Art 
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de facto parentage, observed that the couple in that case had “shared a 
committed, monogamous relationship for thirteen years.”205 If regarded as 
a criterion, monogamy disadvantages some relational arrangements over 
others. Gay men disproportionately choose to maintain sexually non-
exclusive relationships while still committed to one another.206 Advocates 
should take a long look at the lifestyle diversity among their constituents 
and decide if this moral line is the right one to be offering to courts. 
The Braschi court also referred to the “everyday lives” of couples 
seeking to establish themselves as “family.”207 Similarly, in E.N.O., the 
Massachusetts court mentioned “the plaintiff had daily contact with the 
child and ‘acted in the capacity [of] his other parent in all aspects of his 
life.’”208 This factor goes to the heart of the functional ideal, and rightly so 
given the premium on the child’s bond with the parent. It is still worth 
considering, however, whether some well-meaning gay and lesbian 
would-be parents will fail to satisfy the standard because they are in the 
military, work two jobs that keep them out of the home for a double shift, 
work nights and sleep during the day, or work erratically—say as an Uber 
driver or in some other capacity in the “gig economy.” 
How would it change the Braschi case if the two men had a non-
monogamous arrangement; not enough money, property, or credit to 
maintain accounts, credit cards, or safe deposit boxes; not enough money 
to pay a lawyer to draft a power of attorney or other pertinent documents, 
and no supportive family members? Would the de facto parenthood 
doctrine have applied in E.N.O. if the non-biological mother did not have 
the money to hire a lawyer to draft the co-parenting agreement, and if she 
were on deployment in Iraq when the umbilical cord needed cutting? 
The gay and lesbian legal advocacy community fully appreciates the 
distributive implications of choosing a basis for parentage when 
contrasting people in heterosexual relationships with those in same-sex 
relationships, when marital status is determinative, and to a lesser extent, 
when fathers are contrasted with mothers. It is not at all evident, however, 
 
Leonard, led the court to look at exclusivity and pointed to the “exclusive relationship” of 
Braschi and Blanchard no less than three times. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York In Support of Plaintiff-Appellant 4, 6, 13, Braschi v. 
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87) (on file with author). 
 205. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Mass. 1999). 
 206. See generally Colleen H. Hoff & Sean C. Beaugher, Sexual Agreements Among 
Gay Male Couples, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 774 (2010). 
 207. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55. 
 208. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d. at 889. 
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that the distributive implications along axes of race, class, region, or 
lifestyle have come into focus. As the movement pushes in the direction 
of contractual concepts such as intent and function, all of these dimensions 
should be on the table. The picture of the intended, functional family that 
advocates and sympathetic courts paint will continue to produce norms. 
How will those norms differentially affect gay and lesbian people across 
the array of factors that render the community internally diverse? The track 
we are on poses dangers to the most marginalized members of that 
community where it hurts most: their status as parents and the basis upon 
which their emotional bonds with their children will be recognized—or 
not. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades, gay and lesbian legal advocates have 
been unmatched at acquiring rights against discrimination, to privacy, to 
marriage equality, etc. They have not always been as good, however, at 
thinking through issues of distribution, particularly within the LGBTQ 
community. Our interests sometimes diverge and can even conflict.209 This 
can happen between gay men and lesbians (as Pavan illustrates), between 
predominantly white gay gentrifiers and LGBTQ youth of color (as 
struggles over curfews and police harassment in urban neighborhoods, 
such as Greenwich Village, illustrate210), and between “the Good Gay” and 
“the Bad Queer” (as Michael Warner has shown in the context of 
marriage211). A win is not always a win for everybody, and one LGBTQ 
person’s win may even be a hindrance to fair legal treatment of another. 
Scholars and advocates should consider the widest possible array of costs 
and benefits that could accrue to differently-situated LGBTQ people when 
advancing a theory of parenthood. The difficult strategic decisions that 
must be made in the name of LGBTQ advancement might well hurt some 
people even as they help others. This is a brutal fact of most legal advocacy 
and cannot be avoided. Such strategizing should not be done, however, in 
a way that is heedless of the many differences among us, or that leaves an 
 
 209. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and 
Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers 
[Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. OF CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004) (wildly fragmenting the stakes in Lawrence v. Texas). 
 210. See CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY AND 
THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 185–220 (2013). 
 211. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 109–16 (1999). 
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unintended distribution whereby the most privileged members of the 
community reap the benefit while leaving the most marginalized—by race, 
class, region, and sexual practice—behind. 
 
